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“Comfort women” is a euphemistic term to refer to women of Asian nations conquered and/or colonized during the first half of the twentieth century by the Japanese Empire​[1]​ who were forced into sexual servitude during the Second World War (WWII). Non-Japanese comfort women​[2]​ lived under inhumane conditions, virtually incarcerated in tiny cells and subjected to constant rape and physical abuse by twenty to thirty men a day on average (MG Kang, p.29). At the end of the WWII, all non-Japanese comfort women were abandoned and many were brutally murdered by the Japanese Imperial Army (JIA) to eliminate the trace of the horrendous institutional crime (see Bang, sections 4 & 5). Former comfort women who survived the war and somehow managed to return home stayed silent for over forty years because of shame. When former comfort women courageously “came out” in the early 1990s, they demanded that the Japanese government recognize the human rights violations perpetrated on them by the Japanese Empire, its direct predecessor, offer official government apology, and provide reparation for the harm inflicted on them. 
Although the facts pertaining to the issue seem straightforward and former comfort women’s demands seem reasonable, the post-war Japanese government has refused to meet former comfort women’s demands at face value, at first denying the Japanese Empire’s involvement in the comfort women system and then, when the facts could no longer be denied, offering the “Asian Peace and National Fund for Women (the Asian Women’s Fund, for short)”​[3]​ as private remuneration that did not count as reparation or involve government apology. South Korean and Taiwanese former comfort women and their advocacy groups rejected the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) as falling far short of satisfying former comfort women’s demands for justice. In the meanwhile, the number of elderly former comfort women, which was only a couple of hundreds even at the beginning, is dwindling quickly.
What accounts for this deplorable state of affairs in which the demands of former comfort women for justice are unmet even after twenty years since the reemergence of the issue? Many feminists have identified opposing nationalisms between Japan and affected countries, in particular South Korea, as a major culprit in this stalemate. This is not surprising given the wealth of feminist literature on detrimental effects of nationalisms on women. In this paper, I will offer a different diagnosis of, as well as prognosis for, this unfortunate situation by examining the role of nationalism in the comfort women debate. I will argue that nationalism can be conceptualized to be supportive of the interests and well-being of former comfort women and that this conception of nationalism ought to be incorporated into the solution of this impasse. In constructing this argument, I will focus on the case of Korean former comfort women for two reasons. First, the overwhelming majority of comfort women were Koreans, as Korea was Japan’s largest and the most strategically important colony since Japan’s forced take-over in 1905. It is estimated that between 80,000 and 200,000 Korean women were forcibly drafted to serve as comfort women between the late 1930s and 1945 (Yang 1998, n.1).​[4]​ Secondly, and more importantly, the debate concerning Korean former comfort women dramatically illustrates the intersection of nationalism and feminism, as the feminist advocacy group that represents the voices of Korean former comfort women—the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council, hereinafter)—is also nationalist. 
Not surprisingly, the position of the Korean Council (KC) has been criticized by various feminist groups, both domestic and international, for its unapologetically nationalist stance. Paradoxically, the Japanese government, which is notorious for its own brand of nationalism, also criticizes the KC’s nationalism by partially appropriating feminist complaints against the KC as it launched the AWF. While I recognize that the KC has at times adopted essentialist nationalist rhetoric, which led to legitimate concerns by feminists, I will provide in this paper a philosophically justifiable reconstruction of the KC’s nationalist position by explicating the concept of national responsibility, which is prominently featured in the KC’s position. Premised on this reconstruction, I will conclude that the KC’s position that the current Japanese government has national responsibility to fully acknowledge the harm that its predecessor, the Japanese Empire, has inflicted on former comfort women is plausible. It will then be considered whether Japan’s Asian Women’s Fund counts toward fulfilling Japan’s national responsibility. In the last section, feminist concerns about the KC’s nationalist position will be addressed. 

I.	The Korean Council and Japan’s Asian Women’s Fund
Before offering a philosophical reconstruction of the Korean Council (KC)’s nationalist position and its defense, this section will provide some background information. After the end of the Second World War (WWII), the silence surrounding the issue of comfort women was so complete that the Korean public was unaware of it for the next 45 years. Korean feminists who finally learned of this issue in the late 1980s formed the KC, a feminist organization (Choi, p.28; HJ Lee, pp.313, 316), in 1990 with an explicit aim to “restore the victims’ dignity and to correct the distorted relationship between Korea and Japan.”​[5]​ It was only in 1991 that the issue of the WWII comfort women finally surfaced in the Korean public arena when a courageous former comfort woman, then sixty seven year old Hak-Seon Kim, “came out” and publicly testified about her experience as a WWII comfort woman. Other former comfort women followed suit. Most had endured a life time of extreme hardship after their return to Korea. Having lost the sole virtue for women—chastity—according to the Confucian tradition, most of them were unable to marry. Those who married were often unable to have children, as a result of either contracting sexually transmitted diseases or receiving harsh chemical treatments to cure them. Consequently, they were condemned to live in abject poverty, as women had extremely limited options at gainful employment in the patriarchal Korean society. Without either a husband or children to take care of them in their old age, as is the custom in Confucian Korea, they were leading a life of hand-to-mouth existence by engaging in the lowest menial jobs as prostitutes, cleaning women, house servants, or day laborers (see, SH Lee). 
The KC has been the most visible and tireless advocate of Korean former comfort women, on whose behalf it has argued that the Japanese government must fulfill its seven-fold national responsibility to redress the harm inflicted on former comfort women: The Japanese government must (i) admit “the crime of the compulsory drafting of Korean women as ‘comfort women’”; (ii) fully investigate “all the barbarities”; (iii) offer “an official apology approved by the Japanese Diet”; (iv) make “legal compensations for the survivors and their bereaved families”; (v) record “all the facts and truth about the Military Sexual Slavery by Japan … in the Japanese history textbooks”; (vi) build “a memorial and a museum”; and (vii) punish “those responsible for the crime” (http://www.womenandwar.net/english/menu_01.php (​http:​/​​/​www.womenandwar.net​/​english​/​menu_01.php​)). These demands can be categorized under three headings most relevant to our investigation: (1) Public recognition that the Japanese Empire has committed a grave wrongdoing against former comfort women, which would require (a) a full investigation of facts, (b) the punishment of the perpetrators, and (c) recording of facts in history texts for future generations; (2) an official government apology; and (3) proper legal compensation as reparation for the harm former comfort women suffered.​[6]​ I will take these three elements to be constitutive of Japan’s national responsibility at the heart of the KC’s nationalist position.
The notoriously nationalist post-war Japanese government, on the other hand, has been actively and adamantly denying for almost fifty years the Japanese Empire’s involvement in the comfort women system, citing the lack of evidence.​[7]​ Finally in 1992 when Yoshimi Yoshiaki, a Japanese historian, discovered some official documents that exposed the JIA’s operation of comfort stations, the Japanese government finally admitted, albeit reluctantly, the historical existence of the comfort women system. In 1995, then Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi proposed at a press conference “An Appeal for Donations for the Asian Women’s Fund,” the purpose of which was to offer “the Japanese people’s atonement” for the harm inflicted on and promote the welfare and medical care of the non-Japanese former comfort women. Consequently, the Japanese government launched the “Asian Peace and National Fund for Women (Asian Women’s Fund),” the disbursement of which was divided into two kinds of payment, one the “atonement money” and the other the “medical and welfare” money (Soh 2003, p.210). While the Japanese government contributed money “to subsidize the Fund’s expenses,” the AWF is not a governmental organization​[8]​: First, the atonement money was raised strictly through donations from the Japanese civilians (Nishino, p.53); and second, its staff members are civilians and not government officials. Despite frequent references to “atonement,” their website reiterates the “Government’s position” that this money does not count as reparation for war crimes, since “the issues of reparation, material restitution and the right to claim compensation for events in the war” have “already been dealt with by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, bilateral treaties and other relevant accords, and that Japan had acted in accordance with those treaties and accords.” Consequently, “Japan could not offer compensation to individuals” through the AWF disbursement.​[9]​ 
Initially, most former comfort women and their advocacy groups in affected Asian countries objected to and resisted the AWF as the Japanese government’s ploy to evade its national responsibility altogether. The Japanese government, however, did not address such concerns and unilaterally began its “atonement projects” and started to distribute the AWF money in 1996. Although women’s groups in countries other than South Korea and Taiwan​[10]​ initially shared skepticisms about the AWF with the KC, they changed their position once the disbursement began. For example, Filipina women’s groups, despite their initial resistance, approved of Filipina former comfort women’s reception of the AWF money (Soh 2003, pp.227-228, 230-231). The AWF money was first delivered to Filipina survivors in 1996 and the total of 285 former comfort women, mostly from the Philippines and the Netherlands, received them by the time the AWF disbanded in 2007 (Jeong 2008, p.70). The majority of South Korean and Taiwanese former comfort women, however, refused to accept the money to the end, not only because they received financial support from their respective governments and women’s groups, but also because they were adamant about getting an official government apology and legal compensation (Jeong 2008, pp.68-70; Nishino, p.54). 

II.	Feminist Critiques of the KC’s Nationalism
Why did women’s groups in other affected countries disagree with the KC’s stance against the AWF? Their reason seems to have been mainly practical: Many former comfort women needed the money, given their indigence and old age. C. Sarah Soh provides an argument to this effect: The disbursement by the AWF counted as a “concrete action” to enable “elderly survivors” to experience a modicum of comfort before they died (2003, p.224). For this purpose, according to Soh, it is of little difference whether the financial assistance comes as “compensation” or “remuneration.” From this point of view, the KC’s insistence that the Japanese government discharge its national responsibility would only prolong the “stalemate of international redress politics” (p.232). 
Yet two general objections to nationalism raised by feminists seem to apply to this case as well. First, feminists have been distrustful of nationalism for its patriarchal nature going back to the era of colonial expansion by nationalist empires. Even regarding Third World nationalist movements in which the rhetoric of self-determination was predominant, feminists of color have raised similar concerns. For example, Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan point out that “the concept of national identity [has served] the interests of various patriarchies in multiple locations” (p.22; see also, Alarcon, Kaplan, and Moallem, pp.6-7). The KC’s nationalist rhetoric seems to exemplify this general point: for example, the KC has characterized the Japanese comfort women system as “the crime of murder to the whole nation of Korea” (Kim 2004, pp.129-131, cited from HK Kim2009) and characterized domestic fund-raising to oppose the AWF as an endeavor to rebuild “national spirit” and take “care of the victims with national love” (newsletter, vol. 11, March 1997, cited from HK Kim). Such rhetoric presupposes a binary nationalist logic of pitting Korea as the victim against Japan as the “national enemy.” In this process, the KC seems to minimize the role of Korean patriarchy in exacerbating the misery of former comfort women after national independence by shaming these women into silence (Yang, p.132). 
Secondly, feminists point out that nationalism tends to divide feminists with conflicting nationalist aspirations, thereby weakening international feminist collaborations. The KC’s nationalism seems to have damaged both domestic and “global feminist solidarity on the universal issue of gender” (HK Kim2009). In its attempt to prevent the AWF money from being disbursed among Korean survivors, the KC, in alliance with other Korean civil groups, requested in 1996 that the Korean government provide monthly welfare stipend to former comfort women, which was granted by the Kim Dae-Joong administration (Jeong 2008, p.69).  In the process, however, the KC asked the Korean government to require former comfort women to pledge that they would not accept the AWF money as a condition for receiving the government support (see Kim 2004, p.133, cited in HK Kim 2009). Under these circumstances, seven Korean comfort women secretly received money from the AWF by 1997. When this was revealed, the KC reprimanded these women and the government, at the KC’s behest, demanded from them the return of the government welfare stipend that they had received. Other Korean women’s groups criticized the KC’s reaction as overly harsh (Soh 2000, p.125). This incident seems to confirm that the KC’s nationalism generated divisiveness among not only former comfort women but also women’s groups (Soh 2003, p.228). 
The KC’s nationalism also seems to have damaged solidarity among feminist advocacy groups in affected Asian countries. This is particularly troubling, as, according to the transnational feminist Valentine Moghadam, feminists must “eschew[] nationalisms in favor of solidarity beyond borders” (p.89). Feminists must “see themselves as part of the global women’s movement” (p.91), forming “a conscious crossing of national boundaries and a superseding of nationalist orientations” (p.83). Even before the advent of the AWF, some women’s groups from other countries expressed concerns about the strident nationalist stance of the KC as being reflective of the particular history of Korea as the longest colony of the Japanese Empire. When the KC raised the AWF question in Asian Solidarity Conferences and asked for support from the Asian Women’s Coalition in opposing the AWF, many from other Asian countries raised similar issues with the KC’s nationalist discourse. As previously mentioned, the feminist coalition of Asian countries against the AWF finally disintegrated when Filipino former comfort women, supported by Filipino women’s NGOs, began to receive the AWF money (Chung 2004, pp.116-117).
These are important concerns that must be addressed, and I will come back to these in the last section. Despite such concerns about the KC’s nationalism, there is at least one respect in which the KC’s position must be taken seriously. In particular, the KC attempts to represent former Korean comfort women’s voices. Korean former comfort women were adamant that Japan fulfill its national responsibility that includes official government apology as well as individual compensation. They argue that Japanese colonialism had direct causal links to the indignities they suffered as WWII comfort women and consider the Japanese Empire that instituted and implemented the comfort women system as the most direct culprit for the inhumane and unjust treatment they experienced. Their views should not be taken as resulting from brainwashing by Korean nationalists. Korean former comfort women were not oblivious to the hardships they experienced after they returned home and many fully recognize that Korean Confucian patriarchy contributed to their continued suffering.​[11]​ It is difficult to deny that the primary harm to former comfort women, which led to secondary harm they experienced upon their homecoming, was caused by the institution of comfort women system run by the JIA. If so, then former comfort women’s demand seems legitimate that the Japanese government, as a direct successor of the Japanese Empire, fulfill its national responsibility that includes issuing official government apology and dispensing individual compensation. Based on this intuition, I will reconstruct a philosophical argument in the next section to justify the KC’s nationalist position, representing former comfort women’s demands, that the nation of Japan discharge its national responsibility. 

III.	Idea of National Responsibility 

Making a case for Japan’s national responsibility requires first and foremost a clarification of the concept of national responsibility as well as a justification for holding the Japanese government nationally responsible for mitigating the harm inflicted on former comfort women by the Japanese Empire. This section is devoted to the first task. 
National responsibility is a species of “collective responsibility” attributable to groups, and its members share in collective responsibility by virtue of their membership in those groups. If a group has collective responsibility, then “causal responsibility” as well as “blameworthiness” for harming someone can be ascribed to it (Smiley 2009).​[12]​ A group as understood here is not an “aggregate collectivity” which is merely a collection of individuals, but rather a “conglomerate collectivity”​[13]​ whose identity is “not exhausted by the identities of the persons in them” (Jones 2008). In other words, despite changes in its constitutive membership the group maintains its independent identity as a group. Examples of groups as conglomerate collectivity include political parties, NGOs, religious groups, university faculties, business corporations, and nations. Nation is a physically extended intergenerational community united by “common sympathies” among members generated by a common culture (Rawls 1999, p.24). Culture, in turn, will be understood as a comprehensive way of life, predicated on common institutions, language, valuational (moral/religious) frameworks, and history, shared by members.​[14]​ Nation in this sense is distinct from “state,” which is primarily a territorial-political unit.​[15]​ 
The identity of nation as conglomerate collectivity is determined by national culture shared by members (Herr 2006, p.317). National members not only self-identify with the national culture but also mutually recognize one another as national co-members (Raz, p.445). The sharing of common national culture as well as members’ self-identification and mutual recognition as national members have been greatly facilitated in modern nation-states by the institutionalization of standardized general education (Gellner 1983) and print capitalism (Anderson 1991).​[16]​ Their common national culture makes it possible for members to “share aims and outlooks in common” and “recognize their like-mindedness” (Miller, p.117). Consequently, they are more likely to feel emotional allegiance to their nation and co-members and regard the continued existence as well as the flourishing of their nation as “a valuable good” (p.125). Indeed, national members consider elements of national culture, such as “territory, institutions, physical and cultural capital,” as national “assets,” which constitute “a common inheritance” to be bequeathed to future generations (Miller, p.151). 
Nation understood in this way can be viewed as acting collectively when actions and decisions taken by political leaders in the name of nation in question “embody to a greater or lesser extent the articulated beliefs and attitudes of the nation in question” (Miller, p.126). The articulated beliefs and attitudes of the nation would be derived from cultural beliefs and attitudes widely shared by the majority of national members. Some theorists may think that reaching political decisions that embody “the articulated beliefs and attitudes” of members who share the national culture requires modern political mechanisms such as democracy. Indeed, as Miller recognizes, it is undoubtedly the case that the more democratic the nation, the more justifiable it would be to hold it collectively responsible for its collective actions (p.130). 
Requiring democracy for national responsibility, however, would pose a problem for holding the Japanese Empire collectively responsible for its unjust policies and actions against members of conquered and/or colonized nations. The Japanese Empire was by no means democratic and had a strict hierarchical and totalitarian political and social structure over which the Emperor had absolute and incontestable authority. In order to hold collectively responsible nations that perpetrated the most egregious wrongs during the era of colonialism, such as the Japanese Empire, it must be possible to consider nondemocratic and authoritarian nations as capable of collective action. 
In order to disaggregate democracy and national collective action, it might be useful to construe “collective action” more broadly as involving a situation in which “group members aid one another in significant ways and thereby enable other members to act differently than they could act on their own,” as suggested by Larry May (May, p.2). May came up with this definition in order to attribute collective responsibility even to mobs.​[17]​ This broader definition would allow us to hold a group collectively responsible for wronging someone although no systematic coordination or cooperation preceded its collective action. In other words, by construing collective action in this way, we can bring “even those [within the group] who play no direct role in producing the outcome that concerns us … within the scope of collective responsibility” (Miller, p.117). 
Yet a necessary component in holding even group members not directly involved in the wrongful action responsible is that they “share aims and outlooks in common” and “recognize their like-mindedness, so that when individual members act they do so in the light of the support they are receiving from other members of the group” (Miller, p.117). In other words, these members must feel “solidarity” with one another (May, p.35). Solidarity does not require “the formal, explicit decision-making structures” of an organized group (p.37) but is predicated on “common interest to act together to achieve a common purpose” (p.38). Collective action so broadly understood would be applicable to the case of nation, as national collective actions are often predicated on solidarity among national members based on “common interest … to achieve a common purpose.” This is furnished by the sense of affinity that national members feel toward their national culture as well as sympathy toward one another. This generates a common commitment to ensure not only the existence but also the flourishing of their nation into the future. 
What if, however, the national culture on which solidarity among national members is predicated is morally unjustifiable? The common culture of the Japanese Empire at the time of colonial expansion is a case in point. The Japanese culture is based on Shinto, “the indigenous religion of Japan,” which views “the Japanese nation [as] one large, extended family, with the emperor… at the head.” Shinto gave rise to the “nativist” philosophy that “the Japanese imperial family was directly descended from the gods of the primeval period.” This philosophy in turn led to “a belief in the inherent superiority of the Japanese to all other races.” This cultural perspective “formed the basis of the ultranationalist movements of the 1930s” that fueled Japan’s imperial expansion (Parkes, p.25). The Japanese military conquest and/or colonization of other nations have been supported by the majority sharing this cultural perspective throughout the era of the imperial military ventures, despite the catastrophic end. 
The question therefore may persist: can the majority of undemocratic and totalitarian nations such as the Japanese Empire be held collectively responsible? Might they not be indoctrinated or brainwashed, in which case they cannot be held responsible? While I do not exclude extreme cases in which the agency of the majority is severely constrained by “sustained propaganda efforts by an autocratic regime that allows no dissenting voices to be heard” (Miller, p.130) in communities effectively isolated from the rest of the world,​[18]​ I do not think the Japanese Empire counts as such an example. Undoubtedly, the prevailing ideology pervasive in the Japanese Empire, which rationalized inflicting great harm to others by presuming the superiority of the Japanese “race,” was unjustifiable and immoral. Yet the Japanese Empire as a largely feudal Empire did not have effective social means of control and propaganda that would effectively indoctrinate all of its subjects. Further, more morally acceptable cultural values than the nativist ideology were available for ordinary Japanese, as the nation of Japan has a long history of interacting with other East Asian nations, such as China and Korea, from which it imported humanist values of Buddhism and Confucianism that are decidedly not ethnocentric. Not surprisingly, the existence of conscientious dissenters, however few in number, illustrates that not all Japanese subjects were brainwashed puppets at the time of the Japanese Empire’s colonial expansion.


IV.	National Responsibility as Inherited Responsibility

The existence of a minority of conscientious dissenters​[19]​ who oppose on moral grounds aggressive military ventures widely supported by the majority raises another concern: how can the whole nation be collectively responsible for its wrongdoing when there are dissenters who objected to it? As nation uses its national wealth to fulfill its collective responsibility, conscientious dissenters would also incur the cost as taxpayers, at the minimum. One who holds a strictly individualist point of view may say that this is unfair just as making whistleblowers pay for corporate misdeeds is unfair. He may thereby conclude that the concept of national responsibility is philosophically unjustifiable. 
This response, however, overlooks a crucial feature of nation. Although nations and corporations are both characterized as conglomerate collectivity, nations are “multidimensional” groups “bound by ties of race, religion, language, culture, lifestyle, economic system and social order all at once,” while corporations are “unidimensional” (Svensson, p. 426).​[20]​ In nations as paradigmatic multidimensional groups most members self-identify as national members and consider various elements of their nation as “inherited assets” (Miller, p.151). They are thereby committed to the transmission of such assets to future generations in an improved state. More likely than not, dissenters would share in this commitment. If so, while dissenters may oppose wrongful policies and collective actions of the nation, they may not desire to disengage from a process by which the nation can correct its past wrongs. Not surprisingly, conscientious dissenters are often the most vociferous advocates of national responsibility in reality. Indeed, Japanese conscientious objectors were the first to point out the wrongness of the Japanese Empire’s policies and actions and were the most insistent on accepting national responsibility for such wrongdoings (Soh 2003, pp.216-17). 
The concept of nation as inherited assets would also justify holding responsible national members who were either children or unborn at the time of wrongdoing, should the time of national reckoning occur in their adulthood. As mentioned earlier, the issue of comfort women resurfaced in the 1990s when most of the key perpetrators, as well as the victims, had passed. Under such circumstances, the question arises as to whether holding responsible the nation of Japan, consisting of members the majority of whom were born after the event, is morally justifiable. I believe the answer is a “yes.” National members are born into nation without choice. Yet in the process of enculturation into the national way of life they come to identify with the trials and tribulations of previous generations, thereby taking pride in their achievements and empathizing with their losses. In other words, members, as they mature, come to consider themselves as legitimate heirs to “national assets” to be cherished into an indefinite future. This national inheritance, however, is not something to be maintained in its original form as intact as possible. Rather, it is an inheritance that the current generation must improve so that it would be bequeathed to future generations in a better state than it was received. 
This dynamic conception of nation as inheritance to be transmitted to the indefinite future in an improved state is a familiar idea. What counts as an “improvement” of national inheritance, however, has been subject to intense contestations among members in most nations that can afford to have such political debates, past and present. Although such political debates would manifest in different ways in different nations depending on their historical and cultural contexts, the gist of such disagreements would be between those who view the national improvement materialistically and those who view it morally. In nations that aspired to world dominance, such as the Japanese Empire, it was the materialistic view that prevailed. This is not surprising, given a causal loop between material wealth and military power: More material wealth enabled military build-up and military might fueled more aggressive pursuits of material wealth, often through the conquest and colonization of weaker nations. From a moral point of view, however, the materialistic interpretation is obviously problematic, as it entails the subjugation and oppression of others. If one opts for the moral interpretation of national improvement, on the other hand, the obligation of the current generation to leave the nation in an improved state must involve moving the nation closer to realizing its cultural/national moral ideals. In this interpretation, the current generation inherits  not only national assets but also national burdens, especially those incurred as a result of harming members of other nations. In other words, whatever else the current generation inherits from previous generations, it also inherits the national responsibility to correct the injustice committed by earlier generations. In this sense, national responsibility is inherited responsibility.  

V.	Japan’s national responsibility toward former comfort women
If the current Japanese government has inherited national responsibility toward former comfort women, what exactly should Japan do to “atone” for its wrongdoing? Does the AWF count toward discharging Japan’s national responsibility? I believe that the Japanese government’s national responsibility, whatever else it may include, must include the following three-fold desiderata incorporated into the KC’s demands: (1) fully accepting the fact that its predecessor has committed a grave wrongdoing against former comfort women, which would entail (a) a full investigation of historical facts, (b) the punishment of the perpetrators, and (c) teaching the next generation about these facts so that history would not repeat itself; (2) providing proper legal compensation as reparation to former comfort women for the harm they suffered; and (3) offering former comfort women an official government apology. Has Japanese government met any of these demands and is the AWF an appropriate means to fulfill any of these responsibilities? The answer, sadly, is in the negative. 
 First, the Japanese government has reluctantly recognized the existence of the comfort women system only in 1992. Yet, the Japanese government still has not engaged in any rigorous investigation of historical facts nor punished the major perpetrators regarding the comfort women system. Indeed, many of those most responsible for designing and implementing the comfort women system—top commanders of the JIA—are buried in Japan’s sanctified Yasukuni Shinto Shrine as national heroes (Jeong 1997, p.430). Although the Japanese government insists that issues of factual investigation and punishment have “already been dealt with by the San Francisco Peace Treaty” of 1951, this treaty was inherently flawed on multiple levels: Korea, despite being one of the most victimized nations by Japan, was excluded from even participating in the negotiations then led by the US and the UK, as it was not a member of the Allied Forces of the Second World War (Nakano, p.25). Under such circumstances, Japan was not held responsible for its war crimes as rigorously as it should have been, as the US was keen on keeping Japan as an economically strong ally in East Asia to forestall the expansion of the communist Soviet Union (Jeong 1997, p.393). 
The most dramatic indication that Japan’s “atonement” is not genuine, however, is the active and persistent attempt by the Japanese government to leave out any mention of comfort women in Japan’s middle school history textbooks. Ironically, such attempts first began at roughly the same time as the establishment of the AWF. Japanese politicians have continued to express publicly the view that “the comfort women issue is made up” or “comfort women were selling sex.” As late as in 2004, then Minister of Education and Culture Nakayama Nariaki publicly endorsed the elimination of the word “comfort women” from middle school textbooks (Nishino, pp.57-8). By 2006, the middle school history books adopted by Japanese schools did not contain any mention of comfort women at all (Nakano and Kim, p.5). 
Despite such inconsistent behavior by Japanese politicians, one might argue that the AWF is a positive move toward fulfilling the other two elements of Japan’s national responsibility to former comfort women: proper legal compensation and an official government apology (Soh 2003). Regretfully, this is not the case. First, the Japanese government makes it clear on the AWF official website that the AWF is not intended as “compensation to individuals.”  Money from the AWF is not reparation, as, according to the Japanese government, the issue of reparation has been resolved in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea (Basic Relations Treaty, for short). The reality, however, is different. As we have seen, the article 14 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty allows only member nations of the Allied Forces to request reparation from Japan, and  Korea was ineligible (Jeong 1997, p.398). On the other hand, negotiations for the Basic Relations Treaty between South Korea and Japan did include matters of reparation. When the two nations signed the final agreement in 1965 after acrimonious disagreements, however, a large portion of the money that came to South Korea from Japan was in the form of a loan for “economic cooperation” (p.399). In exchange for a small portion of “free money,” the Japanese government strongly pressured, successfully, the South Korean government to give up the right to future reparations, should they be called for (Nakano, p.25). Not surprisingly, the existence of the WWII comfort women was not recognized in either of these two treaties. 
It is under these circumstances that not only the KC, but also some international bodies recommended proper investigations of the comfort women system and reparation to individual former comfort women. For example, the UN special rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy stated that the AWF, although “a welcome beginning,” does not exempt the Japanese government from “the legal claims of the comfort women under public international law” (Coomaraswamy 1996, para. 125 and para. 134); the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) also recognized in their publication, “Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal,”  that the reparation to former comfort women was a separate issue from what had been “resolved” in 1951 (Jeong 2008, p.74). Such recommendations, however, seem to have fallen on deaf ears.
Does the AWF fulfill Japan’s national responsibility to offer former comfort women an official government apology? Melisssa Nobles defines apology as “an acknowledgment and moral evaluation of wrongdoings” (Nobles, p.28). If so, then the Japanese government is beholden to apologizing to the former comfort women for the grave harm its predecessor had inflicted on them. Soh claims that a proper apology has been offered by the Japanese government, as the AWF money was disbursed: Not only does the term “atonement” that characterizes the AWF money “connote[] a crime/sin or wrongdoing for which one wishes to express sincere apology and seek forgiveness” (Soh 2003, p.226), but also the Japanese prime minister’s letter of apology had accompanied the delivery of the AWF money. 
The prime minister’s letter, however, was attached to the “medical/welfare support” money rather than the “atonement money” (p.222). Further, the letter only expressed his “personal feelings” of “apology and remorse” (p.225). [this part has been corrupted in the published version!] The qualifier “personal” is significant, as there are two kinds of apologies that can be offered by nations concerning their past wrongdoings, one by heads or representatives of state and the other by governments.​[21]​ According to Nobles, among seventy two apologies offered by states and their agents since the twentieth century, well over fifty percent have been offered by heads of state (p.4) and only eight have been offered by governments (p.6). The former tends to be mere “verbal utterances” that mostly do not involve any governmental commitment such as compensation (p.5). The latter, on the other hand, by and large involves “historical and catastrophic wrongs” (p.6) and results in “deliberative processes that have frequently been accompanied by monetary compensation” (p.5). According to this distinction, the type of apology that ought to be expressed in the case of comfort women is an official government apology. Many Japanese prime ministers have expressed apologies in the past. Indeed, out of 44 heads of state apologies, 11 were by Japanese prime ministers concerning Japan’s WWII wrongdoings, the oldest one dating back to 1965. This indicates that utterings by the Japanese heads of state, whether the term involved is “regrets,” “remorse,” or “apologies,” do not carry much substance. Indeed, all ended up as mere lip service, despite the rhetoric of being “sincere” or “deep” or “heartfelt” (Nobles, Appendix).​[22]​ If Japan’s intent to “atone” for the past wrongdoings is “sincere,” then Japan must provide an official apology by its government. 
One might still argue that the demands made by the KC are too stringent. Although the AWF does not meet the strict definitions of “reparation/compensation” or “official apology,” AWF must be assessed for what it has accomplished, which has “proven to be a ‘constructive compromise’ measure.” In Soh’s estimation, the AWF has been “unfairly belittled” (Soh 2003, p.221). The AWF’s implementation of its projects, although “imperfect and limited,” was “still substantive” in helping the victims to “begin the process of healing their decades-long inner wounds through a sense of finally being recognized publicly for their socially and culturally silenced personal sufferings” (p.232). Yet this assessment misrepresents reality. Although some former comfort women in the Philippines and Netherlands received the money, the majority of former comfort women in South Korea and Taiwan refused to accept the AWF money on grounds of principle. Contrary to the prevalent view among the Japanese, it was not simply “money” (Nishino, p.56) that former comfort women wanted. The main motivation behind former comfort women’s demand for an official governmental apology and proper legal reparation is their abiding and profound desire to be treated as dignified human beings by the very victimizer—or its direct successor—that mangled their human dignity. It is hard to believe that the “decades-long inner wounds” of former comfort women would have begun “the process of healing” when the Japanese government continues to dismiss their rightful demand to be conferred respect as dignified human beings.  

VI.	Reconciling nationalism and feminism

Let me conclude this paper by going back to and addressing the two-fold feminist concerns about the KC’s nationalism: One is that the binary logic of Korean nationalism, while accentuating Japan’s wrongdoing against “our” women, functions to hide the patriarchal oppression of former comfort women within Korea; and the other is that nationalism necessarily damages feminist solidarity, especially at the international level. 
Regarding the first concern, I agree with feminist critics that nationalist discourses and movements have often involved unjustifiably “black and white” rhetoric predicated on an essentialist conception of nationalism that assumes gender hierarchy, leading to detrimental effects for women (see Herr 2003, section II). Yet, as I have argued elsewhere (2003, 2006), non-essentialist constructions of nationalism that promote equal membership among women and men are compatible with feminism. While the KC has at times resorted to binary rhetoric characterizing Japan as the “enemy” and focused exclusively on Japan’s wrongdoing against former comfort women, its feminism is ultimately incompatible with essentialist conceptions of nationalism. Therefore the KC must avoid such rhetoric and pay sufficient attention to the role played by Korean patriarchy in forcing former comfort women to suffer in silence. 
Still, it is undeniable that the primary harm to former comfort women, which exacerbated their suffering under Korean patriarchy, was inflicted by the Japanese Empire that had established and operated the comfort women system. Also, members of a nation who have received egregiously unjust treatment under conditions of conquest and colonialism by another nation can justifiably demand that such injustices be rectified. Therefore, despite the KC’s occasional lapses in rhetoric, I believe that the KC has been largely on the right track in its nationalist stance that the current government of Japan fulfill its inherited national responsibility to mitigate the harm its predecessor had inflicted on former comfort women. 
Indeed, former comfort women and their feminist advocacy groups in all affected countries were in agreement, at least initially, with the KC’s nationalist position regarding the issue of comfort women, which consists of two main claims: (1) the Japanese government has national responsibility toward former comfort women and (2) the establishment of the AWF does not count toward fulfilling Japan’s national responsibility. The disagreement regarding the AWF among women’s groups and former comfort women in different nations was never about these two core constituents of the KC’s nationalist position. 
The short-lived unified opposition to the establishment of the AWF began to falter, however, as soon as the Japanese government began to disburse the AWF money unilaterally, without attempting to respect, let alone consider, the rationale for the opposition. As mentioned previously, women’s groups in the Philippines approved of the acceptance of the AWF money by Filipina former comfort women largely because of their “financial problems” in the absence of any government welfare assistance. Some Filipina former comfort women even publicly professed that they are receiving the money out of necessity (Soh 2003, p.228). Undoubtedly, one reason why most Korean former comfort women were able to resist the temptation of the AWF money was that they received financial assistance from not only the KC, raised through private fund-raising, but also the Korean government in the form of monthly welfare stipends. Upholding one’s principles and maintaining one’s dignity is difficult when one’s survival is at risk. It seems clear, then, that the disagreement among former comfort women and their advocacy groups in different nations was mainly about whether to receive the AWF money, depending on the level of financial need of former comfort women in different countries. 
Having clarified the points of agreement and disagreement regarding the acceptance of the AWF money among former comfort women and their advocacy groups in different nations, we are in a better position to determine the real cause of divisiveness among former comfort women and their feminist advocacy groups. The popular view among feminists is that the KC’s nationalist position is the major culprit for generating divisiveness. There are, however, reasons to believe that it is the Japanese government that is largely responsible for fueling, whether intentionally or unintentionally, conflict among former comfort women and their advocacy groups through its unilateral and heavy-handed distribution of money despite vociferous opposition. Indeed, some may rightly wonder whether the real goal of the Japanese government’s disbursement of the AWF money was to “divide-and-conquer” former comfort women and their advocacy groups by exploiting their dire economic circumstances rather than to genuinely “atone” for its predecessor’s wrongdoing. Although the blatant disregard for victims’ objections to the AWF disbursement is the most obvious reason for this skepticism, there are others. For example, some Korean comfort women who refused to receive the AWF money reported that they received threatening calls from those working to disburse the AWF money (Jeong 2008, p.75). Moreover, those working for the AWF sued the KC to stop not only its campaigns against the AWF but also its non-AWF-related activities to urge the Japanese government to discharge Japan’s national responsibility, including peaceful “Wednesday demonstrations” in front of the Japanese embassy in Korea. 
If the foregoing analysis is plausible, then the simplistic conclusion that nationalism and feminism necessarily conflict should be avoided, at least on the issue of WWII comfort women. Whatever else feminism may endorse, one of its core imperatives is to confer on women, especially those disenfranchised and disadvantaged, equal dignity and respect. This in turn requires paying attention to and taking seriously such women’s voices. Most, if not all, former comfort women think of themselves not as atomistic individuals but as members of nations once conquered and/or colonized by Japan. They rightly understand that the harm inflicted on them by the Japanese Empire was largely due to the subjugated status of their nation. In their minds, therefore, the restoration of their human dignity will not be exhausted [?] by mere remuneration or expressions of personal sympathies but rather necessitates the recognition by the Japanese government of its national responsibility to mitigate the harm unjustly inflicted on them as members of a subjugated nation.  This requires, first and foremost, that the Japanese government issue an official government apology for Japan’s national wrongdoing and provide proper legal compensation as a form of reparation to each of them as victims of such wrongdoing. 
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^1	  A minority of Dutch women residing in the then Dutch colony of Indonesia were also forced to serve as comfort women for the JIA. However, I will leave them out of my discussion, as their situation differed from Asian comfort women in at least two ways that may affect their perspective regarding the issue: (1) their country had not been colonized or conquered by the Japanese Empire; and (2) being Europeans, they were treated more humanely than their Asian counterparts by the Japanese army. 
^2	  Japanese women also served as comfort women. However, most of them were formerly prostitutes and gave consent to the Japanese authorities. They were also paid for their services and treated more humanely than comfort women of other nationalities.
^3	  See their official website, http://www.awf.or.jp/e2/foundation.html, accessed 8/30/09.
^4	  The precise number of Korean comfort women, however, is not available, as Japanese military authorities destroyed most, if not all, of official documents pertaining to the comfort women system for fear of post-war war crime prosecutions by the Allied Forces (HJ Lee, p.321).
^5	  For a detailed account of the KC’s establishment and activities regarding the issue of comfort women, see Lee 1997.
^6	  According to the UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (2005), (1) and (2) constitute “satisfaction,” while (3) is treated separately as “compensation” among “various forms of reparation” (p.4-5). (2) will be treated separately in this paper, as former comfort women seem to attribute special symbolic significance to it.
^7	  See footnote 4.
^8	  Reflecting this fact, the atonement money was accompanied by a letter from the AWF president—a civilian—and the medical and welfare money was accompanied by a letter from the Japanese prime minister (p.222).
^9	  All quotes are from the AWF official website http://www.awf.or.jp/e-preface.htm, accessed July 8, 2009. 
^10	  These are the two former colonies of the Japanese Empire, although North Korea was not included among recipients.  
^11	  Korean former comfort women’s testimonies have been compiled and published by the KC in multiple volumes.
^12	  David Miller would argue against including “blameworthiness” in the concept of collective responsibility, as the former applies only to “moral responsibility,” which is a subgroup of collective responsibility (p.100). I will accept Smiley’s definition here, however, as I take Japan’s national responsibility to be a case of moral responsibility.
^13	  French 1984 pp. 5, 13; for similar distinctions, see Newman 2004, pp.128-9; Miller calls it “collective groups.”
^14	  See, Kymlicka 1995, pp.18, 76; Raz, 444; Miller calls it “public culture” (p.124). 
^15	  Smith 1983, pp. 176-80. Not every nation has a state, as the Kurds and Tibet illustrate, although in the case Japan the Japanese nation is coextensive with the Japanese state.
^16	  Gellner 1983, p.111; see also, Anderson 1991.
^17	  May’s paradigmatic example is the Paris mob that stormed the Bastille in 1789. See also, Miller p.116.
^18	  The current communist regime of North Korea provides a good example. Even in such cases, however, it is possible to argue that the collective responsibility is still attributable to such a group by introducing the distinction between “moral responsibility” and “outcome responsibility” (Miller, pp.100-101, 119). I will not pursue this strategy here. 
^19	  In principle, the term dissenter includes “permanent and oppressed minorities” (Miller, p.132) and such groups do exist in Japan, such as ethnic Koreans and the Japanese indigenous people of Ainu. However, Japan is a largely homogenous nation with mostly ethnic Japanese, and I will be focusing on ethnic Japanese dissenters in this context.
^20	  For a similar distinction, see the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies’s distinction between Gemeinschaft  and Gesellschaft. 
^21	  Although we have already distinguished between “state” and “nation” (see footnote 15), I will use “state” and “nation” interchangeably in the context of Japan, a nation-state that represents a long-standing nation.
^22	  One exception is the aforementioned Basic Relations Treaty of 1965 that was accompanied by an “economic package.” Still, the package represented “economic cooperation” and not reparations (footnote 1, Appendix, Nobles, pp.155-56).
